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Contributions to International Law and World 
Order by the World Court's Adjudication of the 
Icelandic Fisheries Controversy 
INTRODUCTION 
Natural resources are dwindling in a world of increasing pop-
ulation and advancing technology. One of the resources most 
vitally affected by this development has been that of the oceans; 
as the exploitation of this resource - particularly of fish - has 
become more efficient, the nations of the world have found them-
selves confronted with a genuine limitation on the World 
Ocean's ability to produce food for human consumption. To 
combat this trend, less developed coastal nations have sought 
to guarantee their vital harvests from the sea through the uni-
lateral extension of exclusive fishing zones. Conflict has de-
veloped where one-sid~d expansion of interests affects the long-
standing benefits enjoyed by other fishing states. Within this 
context is set the continuing fisheries zone disputes between 
the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), on one hand, and Iceland on the other. 
The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases\ decided by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in two separate opinions delivered on 
July 25, 1974, attempted to formulate a definitive answer to 
the resource allocation problem for these nations. The cases 
pose two broad questions which this article will endeavor to 
1 Fisheries Jurisdiction Oase (United Kingdom v. Iceland) [1974] 1.0.3'. 3; 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) [1974] I.C.3'. 
171'i. 
175 
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answer in the light of recent law of the sea developments: 
1) Are the judgments in these cases significant contributions 
to the development of international law relating to fisheries ex-
ploitation and conservationT and 2) How effective is the World 
Court in peacefully settling modern disputes of this natureT2 
I. BACKGROUND TO FISHERIES JURISDICTION ISSUES 
Within the twentieth century fishing technology has become 
extremely efficient. Fishing grounds may be depleted by the 
mechanized fleets of just a few countries within a few short 
years. And yet the ocean's resources are said to belong to all 
nations. In 1958 the United Nations, recognizing that conflicts 
regarding the proper allocation of marine resources could de-
velop among nations, convened the first United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. The first conference along 
with two subsequent conferences provide background necessary 
to an understanding of the decisions in the Fisheries JUf'isdic-
diction Cases. 
The International Law Commission, created after the found-
ing of the United Nations in 1945, presented a number of pro-
posals for codification of the law of the sea to the General As-
sembly in 1956. This report formed the basis for the Geneva 
- Conference of the Law of the Sea in 1958. Upon delivering its 
findings, the Commission proposed adoption of a rule "that in-
ternational law does not permit an extension of the territorial 
sea beyond twelve miles." 8 
Four conventions· were agreed upon at the 1958 Geneva Con-
ference. However, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone could not settle upon a uniform limit for 
2 Icewnd's Begulations EstabliBhing a FiBhery Zone With a 50-Mile Limit ..fre Not 
Opposable to the United Kingdom and the Federal Bepublic of Germany, 10 TEXAS 
INT'L L. J. 150,158 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Begulations]. 
8Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3159 
(1956). 
• Convention on the Territorial Sea and the ContiguouB Zone, Convention on the 
High Seas, Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas, Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/Coni. la/L. 
52-55 (1958). 
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territorial waters. The old three-mile limit, established by the 
"cannonshot doctrine" II which limited territorial waters sea-
ward the distance of the range of eighteenth century land-based 
guns, was supported by one-third of the participants. Several 
developing states, together with the Soviet Union, opted for a 
twelve-mile limit. The remainder supported a six-mile or greater 
limit. The Convention also prescribed. a contiguous zones which 
would extend no more than twelve miles. Since this contiguous 
zone would be adjacent to the state's territorial sea and would 
not extend beyond twelve miles seaward from the baseline of 
the territorial sea,7 some authorities argue that, in effect, the 
Convention limited the territorial sea to the twelve-mile ex-
tension previously recommended by the International Law Com-
mission.s The breadth of the contiguous zone could not be 
determined since no agreement had been reached on the inter-
related breadth of the territorial sea. Nor was any accord 
forthcoming about exclusive fisheries zones. 
The 1958 Conference advanced the law of the sea in several 
noteworthy categories. Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas defined high seas as aU parts of the sea not 
included in the internal waters or territorial sea of a state.o 
II Martens, E1JoZution of OoastaZ State JuriBdiction: Oonflict Between De1Jeloped 
and De1Jeloping NationB, 5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 531,532 (1976). 
8 The contiguous zone was defined in Article 24 of this Convention as a zone 
necessary for immigration and other regulations, but it was not the same as an 
exclusive fisheries zone (Law of the Sea - El&cl'UBi1Je Economio Zone, 16 HABv. 
INT'L. L. J. 474, 484 (1975) [hereinafter cited as El&cZ'UBi1Je Eoonomic Zone)). The 
confusion of terminology about contiguous zones, territorial waters, and exclusive 
fishery or economic zones increases the misunderstanding about coastal jurisdic· 
tion (Martens, B'Upra note 5, at 538). 
7 Prior to the AngZo·Norwegian FiBherieB Oase in 1951 the baseline from which 
the territorial sea was measured had been the low·tide line of the coastal state. 
In deciding that Norway could uphold her decree of 1935 which drew her baseline 
from a number of rocks out at sea, visible only at low tide, the International Court 
of Justice redefined international law and extended the coastal's state's jurisdiction. 
Baselines are vital in determining fisheries zones (S. BoSENNE, TUB WORLD COURT: 
WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 144·145 (1962». 
8 Martens, Bupra note 5, at 537; Bee the joint separate opinion of Judges Forster, 
Benpon, Jimhez de Ar6chaga, Nagendra Singh, and Ruda in the Fisheries Juris· 
diction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) [1974] I.C.J. at 218. 
o [1974] I.C.J. 3, 22. 
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Article 2 stated that certain freedoms existed on the High Seas. 
"These freedoms [including fishing], and others which are rec-
ognized by the general principles of international law, shall be 
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests 
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high 
seas. "10 By Articles 1 and 2 of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention the Conference agreed that the rights of a coastal state 
to its adjacent continental shelf relate solely to resources of 
its seabed and subsoil and that the waters themselves would 
legally be considered high seas.ll 
Preferential rights, a concept embodying particular fishing 
rights owed to a coastal state because of her special dependence 
upon coastal fisheries, was proposed by Iceland to the Conven-
tion on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas.12 Iceland felt that, even if adequate conserva-
tion measures were to exist and catch limitations were imposed, 
the dependent coastal state still deserved individual considera-
tion. This Convention, deriving its approach from President 
Truman's fishery Proclamation of September, 1945,18 did pass 
a resolution which declared that a coastal state has an interest 
in the maintenance of the resources of the high· seas beyond 
its territorial waters but does not have exclusive rights of jur-
isdiction outside of those waters. Negotiations between the 
coastal state and other interested parties would be the key 
to conservation of fish stocks. l' 
Because the 1958 Conference failed to reach agreement on 
either the limit of the territorial sea or on exclusive fisheries 
zones, a resolution was adopted requesting the General Assem-
bly to study the advisability of convening a second Law of the 
Sea Conference to deal with these questions. During the in-
terim, in January, 1959, fourteen states including Iceland and 
10 [1974] I.C.J. 3, 56. 
11 [1974] I.C.J. 3, 108. 
12 Article 6 of this Convention is entitled "Resolutiona on Special Situationa 
Relating to Coaatal Fisheries." 
18 Preaidential Proelamation No. 2668, 59 STAT. 885 (1945). For an outline of 
the provisiona of this proclamation ,ee Martens, lUI/Til note 5, at 533. 
u [1974] I.C.J. 3, 109 (Separate op. of Judge Waldock). 
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the United Kingdom met at the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention. In March and April of 1960 the Second Law of 
the Sea Conference was held in GenevL 
At this Conference a joint Canadian-United States compro-
mise proposal was made which provided for a six-mile terri-
torial sea plus a further sa-mile zone of exclusive laheries, 
subject to a ten-year phase out period for nations Aahing in that 
zone. This proposal lacked one vote of the two-thirds majority 
necessary for passage. Prior to this proposal a joint amend-
ment concerning preferential rights, sponsored by Brazil, Cuba, 
and Uruguay, had been passed. 
After a period of Ave years fonowing the Geneva Confer-
ences, nations again began asserting laher,. jurisdiction claims. 
The South and Central American countries initiated two hun-
dred mile zones, referring in part to President Truman'. 1946 
continental shelf Proclamation.1' By June, 1972; after several 
conferences, essentially all Latin American states supported 
a two hundred mile economic (Asheries) zone which recognized 
the coastal state's rights· over the renewable and non-renewable 
natural: resources in the waters, the seabed, qd the subsoil 1. 
Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta saw the problem of ocean 
exploration beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and pro-
. posed this area be considered the "common heritage of man-
kind" in a speech before the General Assembly in 1967. A 
moratorium resolution, opposed by the industrialized coun-
tries, was passed in December, 1969, and forbade the exploita-
tion of the seabed. A year later the General Assembly passed 
the "Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction" IT which provided the basis for the con-
vocation of the Third Law of the Sea Conference. By this 
IIPreaidentlal Proclamation No. 8887, 59 STAT. 884 (1945). Thll proclamation 
It&tea that the Unlte4 Statea rep.rda the natural l'eIourcee of the IUbioU and ... 
bed of the continental shelf contipoul to the Unite4 States &I appertainine to the 
United Statea. ThlI would eomprile an area under the ao-oallecl "laitrh .... " 
and thlI proclamation dill ~ lDelude free-awlmminlr apeetea. 
18 KarteDI, "'JWCI Dote 5, at MO. 
lT GoA. "'1749, 85 U.N. GAOB Supp. 88, at 14, U.N. Doc. A./80SS (1970). 
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time, however, the common heritage consisted of much less of 
the World' Ocean. ,f 
After an organizational session in December, 1973, the first 
substantive session was held in Caracas, beginning June 20, 
1974. Efforts were directed toward creating a comprehensive 
Law of the Sea Treaty; a twelve-mile territorial sea and a two 
hundred-mile economic zone were agreed upon, subject to the 
resolution of some tangential issues18 such as the outermost 
limit of jurisdiction over the continental shelf,18 duties the 
coastal state would assume with respect to conservation of fish 
stocks, the legal status of the economic zone, and dispute set-
tlement mechanisms.to 
The second session, held at Geneva in 1975, provided for 
further compromises and demonstrated as well the increased 
influence of the developing nations working in concert. Expan-
sion of coastal jurisdictions was supported even by landlocked 
states. 
The third convention of this Conference, held in New York 
City in the early spring of 1976, attempted to draft a Law of 
the Sea Treaty to be adopted in the near future. Differences 
among developed and developing, maritime and landlocked, na-
tions make a comprehensive treaty difficult to achieve in the 
light of recent increased state jurisdiction over the seas. This 
development plus other recent changes in international law 
which occurred through the Law of the Sea Conferences and 
contemporaneous political activity are vital to understandiug 
the ramifications of the Fishery Jt4risdictiofl. Oases. 
n. THE ICELANDIC FISHERIES CASES 
Iceland, a less-developed coastal nation, has long sought to 
retain control over her fisheries. On April 5, 1948, ten years 
before the first Law of the Sea Conference, the Icelandic Par-
liament, the Althing, passed a law entitled "Law Concerning 
18 Stevenson and Ozman, The Third United NGtiOfl8 COfI,ference on tho lAw of 
the 8eG: The 1974 CGrGCGI 8emon, 69 Ax. J. IN'l"L. L. I, 2 (1975). 
18 Id. at 13. 
20 Id. at 17-18. 
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the Scientific Conservation of the Continental Shelf Fisheries" 
which gave authorization to its Ministry of Fisheries to regu-
late all fisheries in water above the Icelandic continental shelf-
approximately fifty nautical miles in breadth. In 1952 Iceland, 
applying this authority, expanded its three-mile territorial sea 
by one mile; this exclusive fishing zone was further increased 
to twelve miles in 1958.21 
In 1952 the United Kingdom protested the extension and 
the baselines from which it was drawn. Disagreement continued 
and British-Icelandic naval encounters within the disputed wa-
ters became known as the "Cod War". In 1958 both Great 
Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany protested Ice-
land's twelve-mile extension. Negotiations between these na-
tions and Iceland were begun, and an agreement in the form 
of an Exchange of Notes was reached on March 11, 1961 (here-
inafter referred to as the 1961 Exchange of Notes). Under 
the accord, Iceland could continue to work toward the imple-
mentation of its 1958 resolution for a twelve-mile zone and 
would give six months' notice before further extending the 
fisheries jurisdiction. The United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany agreed to a three-year phase out period 
for fishing between a six-mile and twelve-mile limit, agreed not 
. to fish in seven specified areas, but did not accept any Icelandic 
rights of jurisdiction outside the twelve-mile limit.22 Included 
in the accord was a compromissary clause which provided that 
any dispute was to be referred to the International Court of 
Justice at the request of any of the parties. 
This Exchange of Notes afforded satisfaction for ten years, 
but on July 14, 1971, Iceland provided her required six months' 
notice for termination of the agreements. She communicated 
to the British and German governments in February, 1972, 
that she found it necessary and reasonable to extend her zone 
of exclusive fisheries to include the sea covering the fifty-mile 
1n One source said 1959 (Tiewul, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1973) and the 
Ghost 0/ Rebu. Sic StantibUl, 6 INT'z,. L. & POL. 455 (1973». 
22 [1974] I.OoJ. 3, 113 (Separate op. of Judge Waldock). 
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continental shelf.28 The fisheries limits would thus be extended 
as of September 1, 1972. Iceland also declared that the object 
and purpose of the Exchange of Notes had been accomplished; 
she considered the agreement terminated.24 Further, Iceland 
claimed that the compromissary clause could not apply because 
the International Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction in the 
present circumstances. On July 14, 1972, the Althing issued 
regulations creating the fifty-mile fishing zone. 
In referring the dispute to the International Court of J us-
tice Great Britain and Germany contended 1) that Iceland's 
fifty-mile claim was invalid under international law, 2) that 
Iceland could not unilaterally extend her fisheries jurisdiction 
against the United Kingdom or Germany beyond the twelve-
mile limit agreed upon in 1961, 3) that Iceland could not uni-
laterally impose restrictions on British and German fishing 
vessels beyond that limit, and 4) that each of the disputing 
countries was under mutual obligations to negotiate for a fish-
eries regime. Both nations included claims that Iceland had a 
duty to compensate them for interference with their fishing 
trawlers. 
Iceland, conforming with her position that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction, did not participate in the proceedings. She did, 
however, further elaborate her jurisdictional argument to the 
Registrar of the International Court of Justice. The argument 
was based on the doctrine of rebus sic stantib'tes,25 a doctrine 
which states that a treaty ceases to be in force if conditions 
upon which it was founded have changed. The alleged changed 
circumstances were 1) the extension of fishing zones to twelve 
miles by an increasing number of states, and 2) more efficient 
fishing techniques by the applicant states, thus threatening Ice-
land's livelihood. 
Without accepting formal jurisdiction, the Court announced 
an interim order on August 17, 1972. This order set a limita-
23 Already by June of 1972 a 200-mile zone existed in ell8entially all of Latin 
America; Bee dUC'UBBiQfl., p_ 179 mira. 
24 Euhuive Economic ZQfl.e, .tuFa note 6, at 476. 
25 See Tiewul, .tuFa note 21, at 455 for a fuller discussion of this term. 
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tion on the United Kingdom of a catch of no more than 170,000 
metric tons per year within the "Sea Area of Iceland" and di-
rected Iceland to refrain from enforcing its regulations against 
fishing vessels of the United Kingdom outside the twelve-mile 
zone.26 A similar order, issued the same date, restricted Ger-
many to a catch of 119,000 metric tons within the "Sea Area 
of Iceland".27 Iceland replied on August 30, 1972, that she 
would not consider the interim order binding as the Court 
lacked jurisdiction in this case. 
The decision to adjudicate was made on February 2, 1973, 
and was based upon the Court's assumption that the 1961 Ex-
change of Notes was a treaty still in force. Thus it found jur-
isdiction within Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the 
Court which defines the Court's jurisdiction as including "all 
cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially pro-
vided for . . . in treaties or conventions in force." 28 The 
Court could also have based its jurisdiction on Article 36, para-
graph 6 of its Statute29 by which the Court has jurisdiction to 
decide on questions of its own jurisdiction. This approach, 
however, may have seemed overly circuitous once Iceland's 
contentions of a change of circumstances had been discarded as 
irrelevant. The Court held that the object and purpose (of the 
compromissary clause in the 1961 Exchange of Notes) "was 
. . . to provide a means whereby the parties might resolve the 
question of the validity of further claims." 30 In addition, the 
Court felt that if one party has already benefited from the 
executed provisions of a treaty it should be impermissible to 
allow that party to end obligations accepted under that treaty.81 
"Changed circumstances" would have to result in a "radical 
26 EzoZuswe Eoonomic Zone, supra note 6, a,t 477. 
27 [1974] I.C.J.175, 188. 
26 DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 01' JUSTICE 75 (S. ROSENNE, ed. 
1974) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS]. 
29 Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute of the Court states: In the event of a 
dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court. (DOCUMENTS, supra note 28, at 75·77). 
80 [1974] I.C.J. 3, 17. 
81 ld. at 18. 
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transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be per-
formed" and here, they had not.S2 
Despite the Court's assumption of jurisdiction early in 1973, 
direct negotiations between the feuding parties continued. An 
"Interim Agreement in the Fisheries Dispute" for two years 
was signed between the United Kingdom and Iceland on No-
vember 13, 1973; no agreement was concluded although nego-
tiations continued between Germany and Iceland. 
A further jurisdictional issue was raised by this interim 
agreement between Great Britain and Iceland: the dispute be-
tween these parties might have been moot in the light of that 
November Exchange of Notes. After the conclusion of this 
agreement, the United Kingdom did withdraw her request for 
compensation from Iceland for interference with British trawl-
ers.ss The controversy remained alive, however, since the No-
vember Exchange of Notes was considered by both parties in-
volved and by the Court to have been only an interim one, con-
cluded without prejudice to the legal position or rights of either 
government. Thus the dispute would reemerge when the agree-
ment terminated in November, 1975.M Additionally, the Court 
did not wish to discourage interim agreements which might 
promote peaceful settlements.SIi And the Court still had before 
it the case of Germany v. Iceland for which no interim agree-
ment existed. 
By a vote of ten justices to four, the International Court of 
Justice decided that Iceland's regulations were invalid against 
nationals of the United Kingdom and Germany. This decision 
was founded on the principle of opposability, which applied as 
a result of the terms of the 1961 Exchange of Notes. The es-
sence of opposability is that one state seeks to invoke the terms 
of some convention or treaty (in this case, the 1961 Exchange 
of Notes), alleging that this convention or treaty should pre-
82 1d. at 21. 
as 1d. at 8. 
114 1d. at 19. 
iii 1 d. at 20. 
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vail over the principle or institution relied on by another state 
(here, the change of circumstances necessitating Iceland's ex-
tension of her fisheries zone).86 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that the terms of the 1961 Exchange of Notes should 
prevail over Iceland's claim of changed circumstances and in· 
validate the regulations extending Iceland's fisheries zone in 
this instance, it did not conclude that Iceland's regulations were 
invalid as applied to all other states under general international 
law. 
The Court's use of the opposability principle flowed from 
two recent concepts of customary law87 - the concept of the 
fishery zone, an area of exclusive fishery jurisdiction independ-
ent of the territorial sea, and the "concept of preferential 
rights of fishing in adjacent waters in favour of the coastal 
state, this preference operating in regard to other States con-
cerned in the exploitation of the same fisheries".88 Each op-
posing party had accepted these concepts either in the 1961 
Exchange of Notes or in the applications to the Court.80 Fur-
ther, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas had incor-
porated, in Articles I and II the principles of international law 
which provide that no state can validly claim sovereignty over 
any parts of the sea not included within its territorial waters.40 
Elaborating on the parties' rights within the framework of 
opposability, the Court recognized that valid conflicting inter-
ests existed. Iceland, as the coastal state, had preferential rights 
due to economic necessity thus implying a certain priority; 
however, this priority could not extinguish the concurrent rights 
of other States, especially those such as the Applicant States 
whose fishing in the disputed waters had long been of impor-
36 Regulation8, supra note 2, at 152, note 10. 
S7 There was some sentiment that the exclusive :fishery zone was not customary-
that is common, consistent and concordant - international law in 1974 ([1974] 
I.C.J. 3, 50 (Dissenting op. of Judge Ignacio-Pinto». However, although a limit 
to this zone had not been determined, the concept of such a zone was commonly 
accepted. 
88 [1974] I.C.J. 3,23; [1974] I.C.J_ 175, 192. 
89 [1974] I.C.J. 3, 24; [1974] I.C.J. 175, 192-193. 
40 RegulationB, supra note 2, at 156; 8ee alao discuBsion, p. 177, infra. 
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tance to their economies.·1 Thus Iceland's fifty-mile limit regu-
lations were not valid to the extent that they conflicted with 
the recognized rights of the United Kingdom and Germany to 
fish in areas beyond the twelve-mile limit established in 1961!2 
The Court further declared that mutually limiting rights in 
an area of the high seas implies mutual obligations!S The 
parties were therefore under mutual obligations to undertake 
good faith bilateral negotiations to aid in settling the dispute. 
These negotiations must be exercised with the preferential 
rights of Iceland and the rights of the United Kingdom and 
Germany considered and with due regard to the conservation 
and exploitation of the fisheries resources concerned. Secondly, 
all parties had a further obligation to continuously review the 
fisheries resources and to examine conservation and utilization 
techniques in the light of available scientific and other data!· 
Finally, the Court further declared that Iceland could not 
unilaterally exclude or restrict vessels of the United Kingdom 
or Germany from fishing in areas between the twelve-mile and 
fifty-mile limits!5 However, Germany's last submission that 
she should be compensated for Icelandic interference with her 
trawlers was not accepted because the submission was too ab-
stract; the Court could not make an all-embracing finding of 
liability against Iceland!e 
III. CONTRmuTIONs OF THE Fisheries Ju,risdiction Cases 
TO INTERN ATION AL LA. w 
The Court, in the Fisheri'es Jurisdiction Cases, did contribute 
to the development of international law by its treatment of the 
doctrines of the change of circumstances and of preferential 
rights, and by its concern with fisheries zones and management . 
• 1 [1974] I.C.J. S, 27-28; [1974] I.C.J. 175,196 . 
• 2 [1974] I.C.J. S, 29; [1974] I.C.J. 175, 198. 
fa [1974] I.C.J. S, Sl; [1974] I.C.J.175, 200. 
"Id. 
" [1974] I.C.J. S, SO; [1974] I.C.J. 175. 200 . 
• e [1974] I.C.J.175, 205. 
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The doctrine of the fundamental change of circumstances was 
expressed in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention of the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (1969): 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has oc-
curred with regard to those existing at the time of the 
conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by 
the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for termi-
nating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound 
by the treaty j and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the 
extent of obligations still to be performed under the 
treaty.'7 
This doctrine should be interpreted as an objective rule of 
law with no implied condition that the treaty should be termi-
nated if certain events occur; the phrase, "rebus sic stantibus", 
is not employed in Article 62 as this phrase had come to mean 
that the treaty would contain such an implied condition!8 Em-
phasis is made on the restrictive nature of the doctrine; it 
should be applied only in exceptional cases. This strict ap-
proach thus operates to buttress the traditional notion that 
treaties must be honored in good faith.'9 
Article 62 speaks of "a fundamental change of circumstances 
which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time." 
Earlier drafts of this Article limited the change to facts alone; 
"circumstances" is more encompassing and was intended to 
include political, economic, legal, moral, and social changes as 
well. GO In the case of Iceland, the change was alleged to be both 
political (the extension of fishing zones by many states to twelve 
miles) and economic (efficient fishing techniques of other states 
depleting Iceland's food supply). The International Court of 
Justice based its jurisdiction on the supposition that circum-
47 8. RoSENNE, LAW OJ' TREATIES, GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OJ' VIENNA 
CoNVENTION 324 (1910). 
48 Tiewul, supra note 21, at 462-463. 
491d. at 463-464. 
110 ld. at 464. 
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stances had not changed sufficiently to terminate the 1961 Ex-
change of Notes and its arbitration clause. But the Court also 
stated that "the alleged change of circumstances could not 
affect in the least the obligation to submit to its [the Court's] 
jurisdiction." 111 Thus the argument is self-serving and oblique; 
even if changes of circumstances had occurred they were appar-
ently unimportant to the Court's reasoning. 
The second prerequisite, that the changed circumstances had 
not been foreseen by the parties, does not seem to be evident. 
The interpretation of the fishing zone was in flux in 1961, but 
the twelve-mile zone compromise had nearly been adopted at 
the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference.1I2 Although Iceland had 
bargained with the applicant states over a twelve-mile fisheries 
zone, she had indicated in the 1961 Exchange of Notes that this 
zone might be even further increased in the future.1I8 
The third requirement is that the changed circumstances were 
those relied upon as the basis of consent to the treaty. The 
Court held that the circumstances upon which consent was 
based was that of providing a means for resolving the ques-
tion of the validity of further claims." This remedy for re-
solving the fisheries jurisdiction question - by submitting it 
to the Court - had not changed. 
Lastly, the change must radically transform obligations still 
to be performed under the treaty to cause termination of the 
treaty. This stipulation the Court rejected handily: 
The present dispute is exactly of the character anticipated 
in the compromissary clause of the Exchange of Notes. Not 
only has the jurisdictional obligation not been radically trans-
formed in its extent; it has remained precisely what it was 
in 1961.1111 
511d. at 465. 
112 Bee discussion, p. 179, mira. 
118 Bee discussion, p. 181, infra. 
" EzcZuaWe Economic Zone, supra note 6, at 457. 
M [1974] I.C.J. S, 21. 
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However, Iceland believed that the treaty itself was invalid;Be 
thus obligations, such as jurisdiction by the International Court 
of Justice, would obviously have been radically transformed. 
The Court did not direct its argument to this issue. 
Both Great Britain and Germany contended that the doctrine 
of changed circumstances does not allow an unchallengeable 
unilateral revocation of a treaty, as had been done by Iceland. 
Under this approach, the doctrine of changed circumstances is 
not one which operates automatically; it merely permits a party 
to call for termination and then to submit the question to a 
judicial body:'7 Such a procedure of recourse to the Court was 
already included within the 1961 Exchange of Notes. 
Article 62 could be interpreted as calling for a unilateral 
termination or as calling for a judicial decision. The stronger 
argument, however, is that the Court will decide whether the 
treaty can be terminated.1I8 The Court secures this right under 
Article 36, paragraph 1 of its statute ;119 it is the final arbiter 
of the dispute. Also, unilateral state action has never been a 
part of the doctrine,eo and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of Treaties in 1969 had set definite procedures, not 
compatible with unilateral action, for applying the doctrine of 
the fundamental change of circumstances. 
Prior to the judgment it was suggested that the Court could 
contribute to the development of international law by clarifying 
the grounds for invalidating or terminating international agree-
ments by attending to Iceland's contention about the change 
of circumstances.81 The Court did precisely that when it stated 
that the circumstances had not changed sufficiently to invali-
date the 1961 Exchange of Notes. This Exchange of Notes had 
118 Tiewul, suprG note 21, at 469. 
liT IiI. at 470. 
118Id. 
119 Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court states: The jurisdiction 
of the Court comprises all eases which the Parties refer to it and all matters 
specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and 
conventions in force. (DOCUMENTS, suprG note 28, at 75). 
eo Tiewul, suprG note 21, at 471. 
81 Katz, Issues ~ri8ing in the Il'eZandio Fisheries CGse, 22 INT'L. &; Con. 
L. Q. 83, 108 (1973). 
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the force of a treaty, and its compromissary clause was an inte-
gral and still existent section of the agreement. Thus the Inter-
national Court of Justice retained jurisdiction over the dis-
putes .. 
By employing the doctrine of preferential rights rather than 
entering the legislative arena, the Court was able to approach 
a difficult question in a flexible way. The preferential rights 
concept had emerged at earlier Law of the Sea Conferences.a 
Essentially, three conditions are accepted as establishing pref-
erential rights: 
a) The claimant of a preferential right must be a coastal 
state. 
b) The coastal state must be dependent upon fishing for its 
physical sustenance or economic well-being, and 
c) The marine resources must be so depleted as to be unable 
to satisfy the demands of the coastal state and distant-
water fishing states." 
In claiming preferential rights, however, due regard must be 
given to the interests of other states whose vessels fish in the 
same area. "Considerations similar to those which have 
prompted the recognition of the preferential rights of the coastal 
State in a special situation also apply when coastal popula-
tions in other fishing States are dependent on certain fishing 
grounds."" Germany and the United Kingdom do have tra-
ditional economic interests in the same fishing areas as Iceland; 
any resolution of this question requires an examination and 
balancing of the expressed interests of the three states. 
The problem inherent in the concept of preferential rights 
is also its strongest point - that the substance of preferential 
rights must be developed through negotiation by the disputants 
themselves.· The judiciary could not be expected to apply the 
law relying on stable preferential rights. Sociological, eco-
nomic, or political changes could occur within a matter of years, 
a Bee discussion on the Law of the Sea Conferences, pp. 176-180, .'N. 
88 [1974] I.O.J. 3, 25; [1974] I.O.J. 175, 193-194. 
"[1974J I.O.J. 3, 29; [1974] I.O.J. 175, 197-198. 
• [1974] I.O.J. 3,2G-28. 
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thus necessitating a complete redefinition of these rights.- But 
by employing the concept of preferential rights the Court could 
avoid prejudicing the upcoming Law of the Sea Conference 
while discussing the mutual interests involved in the dispute. 
Negotiation, especially in regard to conservation of the fisher-
ies upon which each country depends, would lead to necessary 
compromises in this complex issue and not just impose a legal 
decision on fisheries jurisdiction limits. 
As for exclusive fishery zones, the Court treated this concept 
as one of recent customary law as well. The fishery zone is a 
concept accepting national economic spheres of marine exploita-
tion. However, such zones do not clearly define relationships 
in the context of an active dispute,8T and there is little evidence 
that the fishery zone was, at that time, customary internation.al 
law.tItI 
The limit to the fisheries zone was discussed, and all mem-
bers of the Court agreed to an exclusive twelve-mile zone. Dis-
agreement arose, however, over the evolving notion of a greater 
limit, perhaps fifty miles as in this case or even up to two 
hundred miles. Several justices noted that between thirty and 
thirty-five states had already delimited economic fishery zones 
of more than twelve miles.89 Most of the justices therefore pre-
. ferred the middle stance - conceding that, while a twelve-mile 
zone might not be an outer limit, to approve any greater zone 
would be an invalid exercise in judicial legislation. TO Thus the 
resulting decision discussed these specific disputes and not a 
general fisheries zone limitation. It was left to the upcoming 
Convention on the Law of the Seas to define a broader general 
limit. 
In examining the fishing zone problem, the Court chose to 
refer to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958). By 
88 EzcZ'U8i1le Economic Zone, BUpra note 6, at 483. 
87 Begulatioflll, BUpra note 2, at 167. 
tItI. One justice, in his dissent, argues that the fishery zone had not ;yet been de-
fined in international law, thus Iceland could not be criticized for extending itl 
([1974] I.C.J. 3, 151 (Diss!!nting op. of Judge Petr~n». 
89 EzcZ'U8i1le Economic Zone, BUpra note 6, at 487. 
TO 1 d. at 488. 
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that Convention a state is forbidden from unilaterally extend-
ing its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond its territorial 
seas into the high seas.71 But the Convention does not ade-
quately distinguish the boundary line between high seas and 
exclusive economic zones; the concept of exclusive fisheries 
zones was not negotiated. The Court was relying upon a defini-
tion which was probably inoperative in the light of the modem 
trend of exclusive fishery zones."2 
Prior to the judgments, proposals were made regarding the 
establishment of fishery zone limits through this litigation. A 
decision on limits of these zones just before the convening of 
the Conference on the Law of the Sea could lessen agreement 
among participating nations. The absence of any judicial pro-
nouncement on the subject would contribnte to the uncertainty 
of the law in this area, and this might induce participation at 
the upcoming Conference, since all interests could yet be ex-
plored."· Although there was little likelihood at the time that a 
definitive treaty on fisheries jurisdiction would be forthcoming 
at the Conference,'" a decision on whether Iceland's fifty-mile 
fisheries limit was valid under international law erga omnes 
was the Court's primary function in settling the dispute."1 By 
deciding that Iceland's regulations were not opposable to Ger-
many or the United Kingdom and declining discussion of the 
claim that Iceland's action was invalid against the world, the 
Colirt formulated a conservative opinion. Perhaps it was best 
for "the Court to retreat from the arena rather than to enter 
and lose by engaging in legislative behavior for which it is ill-
suited. " 7. 
In summary, the long-term implications of the FiNlheries Jur-
isdiction Cases may be limited. The Court did contribute to 
developing law by further clarifying the doctrine of the funda-
71 866 diaeuaBion, p. 177, "'tf'tJ. 
72 BlUiuWe BC01IOfIric ZOfl6, "'1'f'tJ Dote 6, at 484. 
ft Katz, "'I'f'tJ Dote 61, at 108. 
" B.6guJaffou, ISfWG Dote 2, at 169. 
71 14. at170 • 
.,. BlUiuWe B~ ZOfl6, "'P"CI Dote 6, at 487. 
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mental change of circumstances. However, this doctrine has 
been continually rejected in international forums, even in cases 
such as these where it might merit some emphasis.T'1 
By prescribing negotiations which would balance the pref-
erential rights of Iceland with the historical fishing rights of 
Great Britain and Germany, the Court influences the course of 
such negotiations. These negotiations, frequently weighted to-
ward powerful nations, must be directed according to principles 
of equity.78 Although the Court did elaborate on preferential 
rights, this concept may not endure since coastal states are 
broadening their exclusive fisheries zones. 
The developing concept of the fishery zone was essentially 
left to the discretion of the upcoming United Nations Law of 
the Sea Conference and other future forums. In flux, forma-
tion, and reformation, international law requires the exacting 
definition and global applicability which can only be supplied 
by international legislative agencies.79 "Since any extension of 
coastal state jurisdiction deprives other states of the benefit of 
certain rights within the high seas, every such claim needs a 
basis in international law." 80 Because it did not attempt to 
delineate a fishery zone, the Court may :find its decisions in 
these cases will serve as a more enduring, albeit weak, contribu-
. tion to evolving international law. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
IN SIMILAR DISPUTES 
What is and will be the role of the International Court of 
Justice in the peaceful settlement of disputes of this nature' 
It is suggested that the Court's function is expanding beyond 
the strictly judicial realm - to promoting and guiding settle-
ments in a broader political context. This expanded function 
is manifested by the Court's opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion Oases; here, it addressed issues of conservation and of 
11 Tiewul, B'LIpra note 21, at 472. 
18 E~oZU8ive Eoonomic Zone, B'LIpra note 6, at 490. 
'f9 Id. . 
80 Martenl, supra note 5, at 552. 
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preferential rights and affirmed the duty to negotiate under 
formal guidelines.tIl However closely intertwined, preferential 
rights and conservation of fish stocks may not be the same 
issues as fisheries jurisdictions,82 but they had been considered 
adjuncts to the 1961 Exchange of Notes and the British-Icelandic 
interim agreement. The Court felt it had to consider "all rele-
vant clements in administering justice between the Parties." 811 
The danger is, of course, that the Court will enter too much 
upon the duties of international legislative bodies, such as the 
General Assembly, and not be able to render a depoliticized 
application of international law. 
Neither is total restraint from legislative considerations a 
viable option for the Court. In the Fisheries Jurisdictioft Oases, 
issues which require multilateral settlement among all states 
who fish off Iceland's coast were limited to only bilateral treat-
ment." Ignoring the applicant states' first claim that Iceland's 
fifty-mile extension was illegal does not foster the world's trust 
in the Court for the resolution of future disputes.811 
That the International Court of Justice may not be adequate 
to settle fisheries jurisdiction disputes is reflected in several 
ways. The interim agreement between the United Kingdom and 
Iceland in 1973 indicates, to some degree, that the parties lacked 
faith in the Court's ability to settle the dispute.ss Perhaps the 
disputants believed an answer would be forthcoming at the Law 
of the Sea Conference. A working group at the Caracas session 
of the Conference indicated the need for the establishment of a 
Law of the Sea Tribunal to entertain claims from individual 
persons and to have jurisdiction over contentious cases between 
a state and an international organization; The International. 
Court of Justice, under Article 34, paragraph 1 of its Statute," 
81 Bflgu'lGtiou, "'".(1 Dote 2, at 162·163. 
82 [1974:] I.Col. 3,14:4: (Dissenting op. of Judge Gr08). 
88 [1974:] I.C.J.175,190. 
M Bflgu'lGtiOftl, "'".(1 Dote 2, at 164·165; in fact, eleven natioDI appear to 1lah off 
the coaat of Iceland ([1974:1 I.C.J. 3, 137 (DiSBenting op. of Judge GroB)). 
811 B~cIM"fl BconomiD ZOftfl, "'".(1 Dote 6, at 4:86. 
88 Bflgu'lGtiOftl, "'".(1 Dote 2, at 170. 
" Article 34:, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court Itatel: Only ltates may be 
Parties in eaaea before the Court. (DOCUHENTS, ,uprG note 28, at 75). 
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has jurisdiction only over disputes between two or more states. 
In addition, many of the developing nations - significantly 
those likely to be involved in a fisheries dispute - have been 
discontented with some decisions rendered by the Court as well 
as with its compulsory jurisdiction in disputes. They might be 
more willing to accept the jurisdiction of a new tribunal estab-
lished to protect the rights and interests of all states in mat-
ters relating to the sea, especially if they were to participate 
in its formation.88 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fisheries issues are complex and everchanging. States 
increasingly believe that they may extend their claims further 
seaward, possibly including a continental shelf of up to six 
hundred miles, absent international law directly opposing such 
action.89 Even after the third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea many issues were left unresolved, although 
there was broad agreement on the creation of the two hundred-
mile economic zone.90 
Essentially the world is looking toward reasonable and effec-
tive utilization of the W o rid Ocean's biological resources. De-
cisions relating to fisheries should thus be based on substantial 
. scientific data. Some data, revealing the interdependence of 
species, indicate that perhaps the two hundred-mile fisheries 
zone itself will weaken and not protect the living resources of 
the ocean.91 Many different theories have been and will continue 
to be proposed both to conserve and to apportion fairly these 
vital food resources. 
88 Adede, Bettleme"t of Dispute, A.riIi"g UAder the Law of the Bea CO"lIe"tiotl, 
69 A:u:. J. INT'L. L. 798, 817 note 29 (October, 1975). 
89 Martens, npra note 5, at 551. 
90 The United States just put its 200-mile fisheries zone into eifect on March 1. 
1977; Iceland's 1lahery zone was extended to 200 miles on October 15, 1975 (Martens, 
npra note 5, at 552, note 143). Bee Taft. The Third U.N. Law of the 8eG Co,,-
lereACe: Major Unre,ollled Fisherie, I'l'U.eB. 14 COLUll. J. TIlANBNAT'L. L. 112-117 
(1975). for a discussion of issues unresolved at the Conference. 
91 Moiseev, 80me BioZogical Bac'kgro'Ufid lor IfiternatioAGI LegaZ Act, Ofl Ratio"aZ 
UtiZi6ation 01 the Li1liAg Be,ource, of the World OceaA, 6 GA. J. INT'L. & COllP. L. 
143,144 (1976). 
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With so much difference of opinion as to how international 
agreements should approach the fisheries issue and as to how 
the International Court of Justice should respond to fisheries 
disputes,92 the Court's action deserves some credit along with 
criticism. Serious problems arise for adjudication in such situ-
ations of rapidly changing value systems, since justice is based 
upon a fair interpretation of the law.98 The Court must depend 
upon voluntary jurisdiction and voluntary compliance with the 
law; thus in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Oases the Court retreated 
from issues which it felt shoUld be decided within the political 
context of international legislative bodies, while coincidentally 
suggesting solutions - a delicate balance indeed. In order to 
attain compliance with its pronouncements the Court empha-
sized the necessity for fair negotiations to promote mutual bene-
fits - perhaps seeing equitable dealing as the basis for endur-
ing compromise. 
The problem of impartial allocation of the world's fisheries 
is a continuing one. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Oases an ar-
gument can be made that the International Court of Justice 
may not have shown fairness to Iceland regarding her jurisdic-
tional dispute - that the circumstances indeed had changed fun-
damentally. But by deciding the invalidity of Iceland's uni-
lateral claim with regard to the United Kingdom and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the Court provides a sufficient basis 
for subsequent political settlement of the parties' disagree-
mentsH while at the same time allowing latitude for upcoming 
international legislative conferences to establish limits to fish-
eries zones. Cooperation and decision-making by all-nation 
participation serves self interests and thus world order better, 
perhaps, than would an arbitrary decision of the Court. 
DONALD A. YOUN'G 
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